

Leading Civic Engagement

Three Cases

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Overview

The following three cases chronicle city officials leading civic engagement and public participation initiatives in pursuit of public goals. From a variety of positions in city government, the protagonists in each case depart from typical bureaucratic processes to reach out directly to the public, using unexpected methods to solicit input, raise awareness, and effect behavioral change in their communities. As you read these stories, consider the following questions:

- *What objectives were city officials pursuing and why?*
- *How did they design their interventions?*
- *Whose knowledge, ideas, and resources did they put to work?*
- *How did members of the public change their understandings, attitudes, and behaviors to become “part of the solution”?*

Case 1 - Seattle: “Please Be Patient”ⁱ

In January of 1987, Diana Gale became the first woman appointed to head the Solid Waste Utility for the city of Seattle, Washington. The task before her demanded a high level of technocratic, managerial, and political skill. Not only was she expected to run a complex operating agency that transacted with residents on a daily basis, she would also oversee a complete overhaul of the city’s waste collection and management system.

The Midway landfill, located about seventeen miles south of Seattle, had begun belching methane in alarming quantities on Thanksgiving Day, 1985. News footage showing mothers and children evacuating their homes cradling pies and half-baked turkeys in their arms, awakened the people of Seattle to what had until then been a hidden crisis. For years, as landfills like Midway reached peak capacity and closed, the city had been steadily running out of places to send its refuse.

The city council directed the utility to study the city’s waste stream and come up with a new plan. That analysis had concluded that with the right set of programs and financial incentives, Seattle could recycle up to 60 percent of its trash and send the rest via rail to a landfill in the rural eastern part of the state. When Gale unveiled the new plan in 1988, recycling 60 percent of household waste was a radical new idea, and one that would require residents to dramatically change the way they handled their trash.

A Deposit in the Bank of Public Goodwill

To minimize the chance of major disruptions, the city divided the implementation of the plan into two stages. In phase I, the Solid Waste Utility would ask Seattle residents to sign up for a voluntary program of free curbside recycling. Phase II was more ambitious: all residents would have to choose their desired level of garbage collection from a menu of options, each with its own price and set of rules for how to organize their trash. The “new garbage rates and services” required residents to estimate how much they would recycle and how many bins of nonrecyclable garbage they would put out on the curb. Residents who wanted to continue to leave their bins in their backyard for trash collection could continue to do so—for a 40 percent premium on their service fees. If residents had extra trash on any given week, they could purchase a sticker at their local convenience store for the overflow bag.

Gale saw the curbside recycling initiative as both an important end in itself and a way to help the utility achieve public understanding and cooperation in phase II: “We knew we had to have a win in order to make the kind of massive service delivery changes we’d be proposing.”¹ Seattle, a city surrounded by natural beauty, drew many environmentalists and outdoor enthusiasts. Gale commissioned market research that confirmed the popularity of recycling. The program, she reasoned, would buy the utility some credit with citizens that it could use later: “We wanted to put money in the bank of public opinion.”

ⁱ This is an adaptation of [HKS Case 1058.0](#), “Please Be Patient: The Seattle Solid Waste Utility Meets the Press” by Howard Husock © 1991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

The mayor and city council approved Gale's request to hire a full-time public relations specialist, Ginny Stevenson, whose job, according to Gale, was "to get on a friendly, first-name basis with reporters." Gale and Stevenson convened a series of roundtable discussions with business and community leaders and members of the local press to help shape the solid waste policy. Stevenson explained, "We wanted . . . an open process. We didn't even think it mattered if everyone came so long as they knew about it." Once the details were in place, the utility held a background briefing for reporters to provide details on the plan and answer questions about logistics. They emphasized that separated recyclables would be collected for free. Even before the new rates went into effect, a household that turned two bins of trash into one of trash and one of recyclables could save on their trash bill.

Gale and Stevenson pursued an assertive media strategy, visiting the daily newspapers' editorial boards "at the moment of our highest control," Gale explained, ". . . before we started!" As the public face and voice of the utility, Gale was gracious when talk radio hosts addressed her as "garbage goddess," and admitted that her own neighbors had ribbed her for failing to fill her recycling bin to the top. When her efforts were rewarded with a positive newspaper profile, she thought it helped the community see her as "not a faceless bureaucrat, but a real live person with children." Stevenson added, "Every story got us more recycling sign-ups."

Following a PR firm's advice to "get a logo, get colors, get an image, have a personality," the utility produced brochures and ads showing the "Recyclettes," a cheerful gang of bottles, cans, and newspapers easing on down a green brick road to the emerald recycling bin. But the most powerful tool for driving participation turned out to be a "recycling watch" that tracked the percentage of households taking advantage of curbside recycling. When the city hit 50 percent, the mayor personally delivered a bin to the "fiftieth percentile" household, and both major newspapers donated advertising space to celebrate the occasion. Just under a year after the recycling program began, the *NBC Nightly News* ran a story on it, cementing Seattle's new reputation as the recycling capital of the US. This was well timed for Gale, who had begun making some major withdrawals from her bank of public goodwill.

"Just Do a Better Job"

Prior to the implementation of phase II, the utility had again briefed the press, bringing along poster-sized versions of the sign-up cards each household would use to choose its rates and services. Gale's staff sent out explanatory mailings and put display ads in all the newspapers. Anticipating that the rollout would be messy despite everyone's best efforts, Gale also made repeated use of a phrase that soon became the utility's tagline. In a series of public service announcements for local television, Gale urged residents to "please be patient."

"Complaints were going to be coming," said Gale. "Getting complaints would not mean there was something wrong with the plan." She made sure that all the city officials likely to receive letters and calls in the coming weeks had all the information they would need to respond to questions and complaints. Still, the rollout of the new system was even rockier than anticipated. Disputes about the details of the plans on offer held up the distribution of sign-up cards. By the time residents got the cards, they had less than a week to make their selections and return them. Many utility clients did not understand that they would have to opt out of a charge for yard waste. There was no procedure in

place for switching rate choices after their initial selections. The utility received 30,000 phone calls in one day, jamming the lines. Confusion reigned.

The policy Gale set for the utility's response to citizens' problems and questions emphasized flexibility and humility: "The best defense is no defense. Just do a better job." Negative press coverage was not only inevitable, but also an opportunity to get crucial information about the coming changes to the customers. A story in the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, headlined "People Are Really Confused," functioned as free advertising space for the utility to answer frequently asked questions.

Similarly, when the changes went into effect in January 1989, *The Seattle Times* and other daily newspapers ran major stories explaining the changes and, as Gale and Stevenson had hoped, linking them to the successful recycling program. "Seattle is ringing out the old year as a national leader in garbage recycling and ringing in the new year with a revamped rate structure and a new list of services," wrote one reporter. But operational challenges confused residents again. Contractors were unable to keep up with delivery of regulation trash and recycling bins. New route plans had not been translated for sanitation workers, many of whom were immigrants unable to read instructions in English. Pick-up days had changed in many neighborhoods.

Confusion peaked in April, and the city council granted a request for emergency funds to help staff phonelines. Stevenson kept in steady contact with reporters, feeding them updates and responding to questions. "You can never assure yourself of good press or cover up messes," said Gale, "but if you can give them stories on a continuing basis, you will get a little slack." Even so, the utility was battered by news stories of elderly or disabled residents whose trash had not been picked up. They were described as members of a "hard core" of 300 or so residents who, for one reason or another, were being regularly overlooked.

To address these problem cases, Gale initiated an "account executive program," sending officials to personally investigate a sampling of twenty or so households. When this effort found that many who had paid for backyard pickup were being overlooked, the utility created new, color-coded route maps for workers. For other, harder to categorize cases, Gale's "just do a better job" strategy was simply to improve the utility's capacity to respond to complaints and offer refunds to residents whose trash had not been picked up, even in some cases where the customer was plainly at fault.

A Citizen's Defense

To respond to the thousands of calls that continued to pour in well into the spring of 1989, the utility launched an automated system that dispensed basic information, recorded complaints, and queued up calls with live agents. Offended, a columnist for *The Seattle Times* complained: "Hello, Solid Waste, may I talk to a humanoid? . . . Nobody down there now but computerized tape recorders. . . . Since the system went into effect, it has been handling between 1,500 and 4,000 calls a day for everything under the sun. On one day there were 500 missed collection complaints. That's how many people had the patience to wait and leave their complaint on a tape recorder. . . . How are people describing the 'streamlined' system to me? They're portraying it in terms befitting the utility: 'It's garbage.'"

But the next day, a citizen's response to the column appeared in the letters section of the *Times*: "It is inevitable, with these sweeping changes over the past year, that there will be some problems. I think that under the circumstances, the service has done a pretty good job [. . .]. If people want to have a meaningful conversation with a human, I hope they can find someone else to call besides the Solid Waste Utility. In the meantime, if they forget to pick up the trash, I am more than willing to talk to their tape recorder." It seemed, at least for a time, that the public might not think the utility's work was garbage at all.

Questions:

1. *What resources (staffing, expertise, etc.) did Gale and the city of Seattle rely on to secure compliance and co-production from citizens?*
2. *What risks did Gale face approaching her challenge in the way that she did?*

Case 2 - Bogotá: “The Carrot Christmas”ⁱⁱ

Antanas Mockus, the former rector of the National University of Colombia, was a mayor unlike any seen before in the city of Bogotá, Colombia, or perhaps anywhere in the world. His political fortunes had sprung from the ashes of his academic career when, in a moment of exasperation, he mooned a rowdy crowd of students and was forced to resign. As a professor, he had studied the relationship between law, culture, and morality, and he taught his students that aligning these three interrelated realms was the key to effective social regulation.

The beginning of his unlikely term as mayor was marked by novel initiatives, such as sending trained mimes into newly painted intersections to gently mock jaywalkers and drivers to encourage compliance with traffic rules. But behind these prankster tactics lay life-and-death issues. Pedestrian injuries and deaths were common in downtown Bogotá, and the mimes were an inexpensive innovation aimed at changing driving culture in busy crossroads.

Another issue that frequently put residents—including children—at risk of life and limb was the unregulated use of fireworks, especially around Christmas. Changing the culture around this dangerous tradition, however, would prove more challenging for the mayor.

Mockus for Mayor

In 1994, Gustavo Petro, a former guerilla leader turned politician, urged Mockus to run for mayor. The people, fed up with corruption and cronyism in city government, would view him as an “anti-politician” with nothing to hide. Mockus saw a mayoral run as an opportunity to put his theories into action. As mayor, he would be able to begin to transform his city’s culture in a grand experiment. For too long, the culture had condoned misuse of public resources, disregard for law, and disrespect among citizens. Under Mockus, perhaps the city would come to see the value of public service delivery, honest (if eccentric) politicians, and the rule of law.

Mockus entered the race as an independent and refused money or endorsement from local political actors. When he won 66 percent of the vote in a city of over six million souls, “with no party, no platform, no experience and no money,” a reporter for the *Washington Post* wrote, Mockus “seemed almost as befuddled by his election as political analysts were.”² He took his oath of office on January 1, 1995.

From the beginning, Mockus made it clear that the usual game of bribes and back-office negotiations for government jobs and contracts would not be tolerated, rankling some city council members. He appointed nonpartisan academics, researchers, and leaders of local cultural institutions to form a senior team dedicated to transforming Bogotá, and they immediately took on the daunting work of drafting a development plan for the city.

ⁱⁱ This is an adaptation of “Antanas Mockus: The Prohibition of Fireworks in Bogotá,” by Inesa Lurye and Archon Fung, [HKS Case 2013.0](#), 2019.

The plan's central goal was to create a new citizen culture, defined as "the sum of habits, behaviors, actions and minimum common rules that generate a sense of belonging, facilitate harmony among citizens, and lead to respect for shared property and heritage and the recognition of citizens' rights and duties."³ City leadership would seek to align citizen behavior with the rule of law through education and positive peer influence. Mockus established an Observatory of Urban Culture within the Institute of Culture to design and analyze creative, often playful innovations aimed at creating new norms of citizenship. All ideas were worthy of consideration, no matter how outlandish. It was the father-in-law of the head of the Observatory of Urban Culture who initially suggested that mimes could do traffic control, an effort that helped lower the number of traffic fatalities in the city by 33 percent between 1995 and 1997.ⁱⁱⁱ

Creating a Culture of Public Safety

It took Mockus six months in office to start getting reliable monthly data on critical incidents in the city, such as traffic accidents and gun violence. Once the picture of city life began to come into sharper focus, it revealed an alarming set of facts. For the first time, Bogotá's homicide rate was higher than Colombia's national homicide rate. An average day in the city produced eleven homicides and four traffic fatalities. Those numbers spiked every year during the Christmas season. Mockus assembled a Security Council, whose members analyzed three interrelated issues: violence, drinking, and traffic accidents. The chief of police recommended a prohibition on the sale of alcohol between 1:00 am and 6:00 am, peak hours for alcohol-related incidents.

In October and November of 1995, the city orchestrated public discussions and an awareness campaign around the risks and consequences of drinking to excess. The plan was to initiate the prohibition on early-morning alcohol sales at the end of December, and Mockus's team decided to publicize the broader campaign to increase civility and safety—especially around Christmas—as "Carrot Christmas" (*Navidad Zanahoria*). The term relied on a play on words in Spanish, which refers to people who walk a "straight-and-narrow" path as *zanahorias* (carrots).

One of the reasons the city was especially unsafe around Christmas was the frequent, unregulated use of fireworks during the holiday season. Hundreds of people were injured each year, and some died as a result, including five children the previous year. The secretary of health wanted to ban the sale and use of fireworks. Others in city leadership resisted, fearing public backlash or concern for the fate of low-income fireworks vendors. Still others argued for better education around the safe use of fireworks. The mayor was inclined to support a ban, but with his chief advisors in disagreement, he created a small commission to consider the matter.

The fireworks issue had complex cultural and moral dimensions. Citizens saw fireworks as part of Colombian culture and identity. Adults looked back at learning to shoot fireworks as children as a rite of passage. But there was no denying that fireworks routinely caused injury and it was particularly hard to justify injuries to children. In a compromise, Mockus decided to limit the sale of fireworks to regulated zones and instructed vendors to deny sales to children and provide their customers with safety education. In tandem with this effort, however, he drew a hard line intended to persuade both

ⁱⁱⁱ This practice has since been replicated and adapted in Venezuela and Bolivia.

buyers and sellers to take the necessary precautions. He told the media that the moment a child suffered a burn, fireworks sales in the city would cease, and his administration drafted a decree to put the force of law behind the threat.

Night of the Little Candles

The 1995 Christmas season in Bogotá began on December 7 with, as always, the *Noche de las Velitas*, or “night of the little candles.” On this night each year, city dwellers set candles and lanterns in their windows, balconies, and all along the streets in honor of the Virgin Mary, and many set off fireworks to mark the occasion. It was not long after the festivities started that evening that a young boy appeared in a city hospital with severe burns to his fingers. The mayor rushed over to meet him. Looking at the boy and his injuries, Mockus felt personally responsible. He had sacrificed this child’s safety and well-being to teach his fellow citizens a moral lesson. As the date for the ban on early morning alcohol sales drew closer, he knew he would have to follow through on the fireworks ban as well.

While word spread of the first fireworks injury of the season and the looming ban, Mockus prepared to meet with fireworks vendors at city hall. The vendors, he knew, had their shelves full of inventory for the season. He immediately asked them to provide a complete inventory of their fireworks stock so that they could be compensated for the lost revenue.

On December 10, the decree prohibiting the use and sale of fireworks within city limits went into effect. Vendors staged protests, even bringing their own to children to set off fireworks in front of City Hall, but city officials held firm. The administration brainstormed alternatives to fireworks. As always, no idea was deemed too ridiculous. Balloons were loud when they burst—what about a giant piñata stuffed with balloons? Mockus painted his face and invited news cameras to film him dancing in the street with a balloon piñata. The city partnered with local supermarkets to sell “carrot kits” that included condoms (to be inflated and popped as a bit of harmless hijinks); a plastic token to offer a homeless person on the street (because approaching a homeless person was a gesture of kindness); and a whistle (to simulate the sound of fireworks ascending).

Following Through

Fernando Guzman, Mockus’s chief lawyer, worked to negotiate a settlement with the fireworks vendors; it was a long process that cost the city about a million dollars over the course of a year. Guzman established a tiered compensation system, with the government buying back inventory from the smallest vendors at 100 percent of market value and from larger vendors at incrementally lower rates. The administration also assisted vendors with alternative job placements and offered vocational training.

Those caught using fireworks after the ban faced “pedagogic sanctions,” meaning “work in the public interest . . . for the benefit of the community.”⁴ This was Bogotá’s first use of community service as punishment in memory. After the first major enforcement of the new law, Mockus, the chief of police, and the secretary of government joined a group of fireworks offenders in the Plaza de Bolívar—the city’s largest public square—to sweep the grounds and pick up trash. By and large, however, citizens

adhered to the ban, and the number of burns over the Christmas season declined 62 percent, from 204 the previous year to seventy-seven.

On December 29, the restrictions on alcohol sales went into effect, and city officials prepared to enforce, educate, and caper their way into the new year and on to the next “Carrot Christmas.”

Questions

- 1. What were Mockus’s motivations for seeking to change the behavior and attitudes of the people of Bogotá?*
- 2. What do you think made his approach effective?*

Case 3 - Menlo Park: “Pulling Out All the Stops”

Menlo Park, a city of roughly 32,000 residents located in the heart of California’s Silicon Valley, was perhaps best known throughout the world as home to the headquarters of Facebook, Inc.⁵ But even before Facebook arrived from neighboring Palo Alto, it was one of the wealthier cities in America, with a median household income of nearly \$114,000 in 2010.⁶ Its location, reputation, and association with a prestigious research center affiliated with Stanford University tended to obscure the fact that, like many wealthy American cities and towns, it was also home to working class and underprivileged people and struggling neighborhoods. In 2008, Mayor Andrew Cohen described Menlo Park as a “fractious city . . . where building consensus has not come easy.”⁷ In 2005, however, when number crunchers at city hall projected a budgetary crisis for the coming fiscal year, City Manager David Boesch moved to embrace exactly that hard work.

“Your City/Your Decision”

Menlo Park’s city council had been trimming the budget for several years prior to 2005, so when declining sales-tax revenues and a sluggish local economy indicated a looming shortfall of \$2.9 million for the 2006-2007 fiscal year, hard trade-offs seemed inevitable.⁸ As luck would have it, both Boesch and Assistant City Manager Audrey Seymour Ramberg had been reading up on participative and deliberative democracy. Their research led them to Malka Kopell, who ran an organization called Community Focus.

Founded in the San Francisco Bay area in 1990, Community Focus was a nonprofit that worked “to facilitate more effective implementation of public programs by increasing community participation.”⁹ Kopell saw in Boesch a genuine curiosity and commitment to the idea that “engagement of the community is not only a nice thing to do, but it helps the city government by paying attention to what people want.”¹⁰ Fortunately for Boesch, the city council was also open to a new, consultative approach.

The city contracted with Community Focus to begin designing an ambitious program for citizen engagement in Menlo Park’s budgeting decisions. With guidance from Ed Weeks, a public policy professor at the University of Oregon who had initiated one of the first participatory budgeting processes in the US, the partners pulled together a two-phase plan called “Your Decision/Your City.”

Phase I: Not Your Average Survey

The primary means for carrying out phase I was a highly detailed survey that went out by mail in the fall of 2005 to every listed resident of the city. A letter on the front page of the survey explained, “The purpose of this special mailing is to give you an opportunity to help design a balanced and sustainable budget that supports what is most important to you. [. . .] Please take the time to fill out and return this very important survey by October 3rd.”¹¹ The mayor and city council signed it.

The newsletter-style mailer contained eight dense pages of information for citizens: a description of the participatory budgeting process and survey; an overview of the operations, revenues, and expenses of every city department; an explanation of the budget problem and the city’s response; and answers to questions the city anticipated from its citizens (e.g., *Isn’t balancing the budget what we*

elect the city council to do? Why spend money on [this process] if we have a budget shortfall?). For those who made it to the end, there was a detailed two-page survey that allowed citizens to build their own balanced budget by pricing out funding changes for thirty-four different city services and raising funds using four different sources of tax revenue. Citizens were also invited to write down any specific ideas for saving money or otherwise improving city services and to indicate their amenability to covering each of sixteen distinct types of services with user fees. Finally, there was a questionnaire to gather demographic information and instructions for returning their completed survey, postage paid (*Thank you for your input!*).¹² Residents could call a number to request the mailer in Spanish, and there was an option to fill out the survey online.

Getting through the whole exercise meant committing at least forty-five minutes, according to Stephanie Anderson of Community Focus.¹³ At the end of that time, however, those who participated came away with a remarkable understanding of how the city spent their tax dollars. To facilitate the process and encourage broad participation, the city appointed an ad hoc budget advisory committee with an outreach subcommittee. With guidance from city staff and consultants, the outreach subcommittee created a hotline, a website, and a suite of materials including flyers, inserts for city bills, counter displays, and street banners. They sent speakers to present the initiative to community groups and congregations, hosted “survey parties,” and kept local media outlets informed.

To test whether these efforts were getting a representative view, the city also selected 400 residents at random to receive with the survey: (1) an explanation of the scientific importance of random sampling and (2) reminders by postcard, email, letters, and phone calls to complete the survey. Comparable results across the mail, web-based, and random-sample survey satisfied the partners that their data was sound. The local weekly newspaper, however, reported that while 20 percent of the population lived in the city’s predominantly Black and immigrant Belle Haven neighborhood in East Palo Alto, only 5 percent of survey responses came from there.¹⁴

Phase II: Sim City Council

For phase II, the city issued an open invitation for the public to participate in one of three citizen workshops to get a more in-depth view of citizens’ preferences. The outreach subcommittee used the same methods that they had used for phase I to get the word out, but also made phone call reminders to survey respondents who had expressed interest. The city planned the workshops at accessible locations around the city, and offered simultaneous Spanish interpretation and materials, as well as childcare at all locations. The Belle Haven workshop had four Spanish-speaking facilitators for small groups.

The media had covered the release of the survey results in some depth, and in mid-to-late January of 2006, one story began getting traction. About one third of the funding for an after-school childcare program at the Onetta Harris Community Center in Belle Haven appeared to be on the chopping block. The proposed cuts would reduce the number of teachers and make it impossible for the service to retain its license as a childcare provider. “This is the only game in town,” a Belle Haven mother told a reporter from the *Palo Alto Daily News*. “When Onetta Harris shuts down, we’ll have nothing. Zero.”¹⁵ When facilitators and city officials arrived at the Belle Haven School on the evening of February 9 for the first of the three phase II workshops, over one hundred people had shown up to rally for the

childcare program. The mayor invited the protesters to stay and participate in the workshop, according to Kopell, “and so they did. They went and sat down at the various tables for three hours with everybody else talking through [the trade-offs].” In the end, Belle Haven residents offset their underrepresentation in phase I by accounting for about 60 percent of the total participants in phase II workshops.

Workshop participants were split into groups of five to thirteen—depending on attendance numbers and the availability of facilitators—and each group functioned as a mock city council. Facilitators were trained in conflict resolution, and officials from various city departments were always on hand to answer questions but were not permitted to make recommendations or state preferences. “We didn’t just throw [participants] to the wolves and say, ‘Here you go, talk amongst yourselves,’” said Anderson.

For the workshop’s budget-balancing exercise, the budget advisory committee and city council had proposed a variety of potential service cuts and tax options totaling \$3.6 million in net cost reduction.^{iv} Every department in the city had been asked to propose cuts to their own budget for consideration. “There were more ways to cut the deficit than needed, so there really were choices,” said Kopell. “It was a tremendous amount of work,” said Anderson. “That’s what made this process real for the city. That piece of preparation is still unusual in the world of participatory budgeting. We’ve seen other processes in comparison where you just think, ‘What is getting handed off to staff when this is done? There’s not enough detail here.’”

Coming Together

With options around topics as granular as public pool hours, city publications, and tree trimming services, most of the small groups were able to reach consensus on a budget that fell within 5 percent on either side of the projected shortfall through a mix of service cost reductions and tax options. Among the findings summarized by Community Focus were “a preference for fee increase strategies over service reduction or service elimination”; “a preference to preserve services that support the health, safety and general welfare of the city”; and “consistency in supporting preservation of Belle Haven services.”¹⁶

In the end, the city council approved \$1.54 million in net cost reductions and passed a budget that relied on \$1.85 million from the city’s General Fund Reserve to close the remaining shortfall: “. . . Council directed Staff to include specific *Your City/Your Decision* strategies in the 2006-2007 Budget that reflected the mix of revenues, service reductions and other cost savings indicated by the community feedback. . . . In addition, Council stated the desire to avoid, to the extent possible, adverse impacts on employees, including layoffs.”¹⁷

Of the 149 workshop participants who filled out evaluation forms, 90 percent or more indicated that they had enjoyed the experience, would do it again given the opportunity, and that hearing their fellow residents’ perspectives had been valuable and influential in reshaping their own views. Recalling the broad support for preserving services to Belle Haven, Anderson remarked that workshop participants

^{iv} This total included nearly \$580,000 of overhead and administrative cost reductions that the city had already committed to. Fang and Kopell, p. 9.

had stood up for their fellow citizens “because it’s good for the community as a whole. Part of that comes from people understanding who uses it, and why they use it, and how it’s going to affect the community.”

“This [initiative] was pulling out all the stops,” said Anderson. “There’s a lot that went into this. It was very, very thoughtfully designed and carefully planned and carried out.” She acknowledged that such a process is not always feasible: “This is a heavy lift, and there’s a reason that more cities don’t do it.” Still, it seemed the citizens came away pleased, and Kopell recalled that one volunteer had even gone on to run for city council. “The education and the relationships outlast the experience,” said Kopell. “There were people who came out of this process who got more and more engaged in the city, and that’s the best part of all.”

Questions:

- 1. What elements of the design of the participatory budgeting process were instrumental for achieving Boesch’s goals as city manager?*
- 2. Were the methods used to ensure an equitable representation sufficient, or should the city have done more?*

Endnotes

¹ All persons and materials cited in Case 1 are from “‘Please Be Patient’: The Seattle Solid Waste Utility Meets the Press” by Howard Husock, [HKS Case 1058.0](#), (Cambridge, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1991).

² Douglas Farah, “Mayor who mooned finds his star rising in Bogotá,” *Washington Post*, June 14, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/14/mayor-who-mooned-finds-his-star-rising-in-bogota/86acff6d-bce9-4dff-b715-ce47e0f0e44c/> February 17, 2019.

³ Ricardo Montezuma, “The transformation of Bogotá, Colombia, 1995-2000: Investing in citizenship and urban mobility,” *Global Urban Development*, vol 1, issue 1, May 2005, <https://www.globalurban.org/Issue1PIMag05/Montezuma%20PDF.pdf>, February 17, 2019.

⁴ All persons and materials cited in Case 2 are from “Antanas Mockus: The Prohibition of Fireworks in Bogotá” by Inessa Lurye (unpublished, 2011) unless otherwise noted.

⁵ U.S. census data, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/menloparkcitycalifornia>, accessed June 18, 2020.

⁶ City of Menlo Park, demographics at <https://www.menlopark.org/816/City-demographics>, accessed June 18, 2020.

⁷ Becky Trout, “How other cities are doing it,” *Palo Alto Online*, February 26, <https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2008/02/26/how-other-cities-are-doing-it>.

⁸ “City of Menlo Park – Budget Deliberative Forum Story,” Institute for Local Government, <https://www.ca-ilg.org/case-story/city-menlo-park-budget-deliberative-forum-story>, accessed December 10, 2019.

⁹ Malka Kopell, “Malka Kopell, Civic Engagement Consultant and Co-Founder, Civity,” <https://www.linkedin.com/in/malka-kopell-3331967>, accessed May 9, 2020.

¹⁰ Malka Kopell, interview by Gaylen Moore, February 6, 2019. All further quotes from Kopell from this interview unless otherwise noted.

¹¹ Ginny Fang, “Your City/Your Decision: Phase 1 Report: Survey Results,” *Community Focus*, November 2005, p. 34.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Stephanie Anderson, interview by Gaylen Moore, February 6, 2019. All further quotes from Anderson from this interview unless otherwise noted.

¹⁴ Rory Brown, “Belle Haven wrestles with budget deficit,” *The Almanac*, February 15, 2005, <http://www.communityfocus.org/MenloParkPhase2.pdf>, p. H15, accessed February 19, 2019.

¹⁵ Luke Stangel, “Volunteers pass out fliers to rally support,” *Palo Alto Daily News*, January 29, 2006. Retrieved February 19, 2019, at Ginny Fang and Malka Kopell, “Your City/Your Decision: Phase 2 Report: Community Workshop Results,” *Community Focus*, March 2006, <http://www.communityfocus.org/MenloParkPhase2.pdf>, accessed February 19, 2019, p. H11.

¹⁶ Fang and Kopell, “Phase 2 Report,” p. 40.

¹⁷ City of Menlo Park, “Budget Report 2006-2007,” June 2006, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.menlopark.org/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/813>.