

“Doing Something with Nothing”

Trying to Make Kampala’s Primary Schools Safer and Healthier

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As Jennifer Musisi, first executive director of the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), remembers it, she did not visit her first government school in Kampala until 2012, a whole year into her term. The early months at the newly created KCCA had been “totally insane,” she recalled. “There was no structure, no form, no staff in place; we were working twenty, twenty-one hours a day, just trying to get the institution into some form to begin working.”¹ She had revenue to raise, garbage and illegal dumping to deal with, roads to repair, transit threatening to break down, and insufficient staff to tackle all the problems. Improving schools may have been far down her to-do list—until she saw one.

A telecommunications company, Airtel, which had refurbished and painted St. Ponsiano Kyamula Primary School, had invited her for a re-opening ceremony. Thanks to Airtel, the school gleamed brighter than most Kampala schools. But what Musisi saw still shocked her: “The school had a population of over 500 children and teachers and they had one desktop computer. What chance do these children have in life, in this age, if at fourteen you’ve never touched a computer?” That same computer was used by the headmaster for his records, and by the bursar for finances.

“We must do something about it,” Musisi thought to herself; perhaps she could begin by appealing to companies that were “decommissioning equipment, computers.” As she would learn, the need in Kampala’s schools was so much greater. Schools had asbestos roofs that risked poisoning students. Toilets were few and decrepit, often without water. There were classrooms with no furniture, textbooks, or paper. Children might be packed five to a desk, which, Musisi noted, “affects their handwriting, their concentration, a lot of other things.” Many classrooms did not even have teachers; absenteeism and moonlighting during school hours were recurrent problems. Some teachers even lived on the grounds with their families in unauthorized structures they had built or classrooms they blocked off for their homes.

It was all so different from what Musisi remembered as a government-school student herself in the 1970s. Like any educated or affluent Kampalan, she knew the government primary schools were bad and she did not send her own children to them—no Kampalan with means for any private education did. But now the depth of the problem was before her, and it was her responsibility. An inadequate government grant paid teacher salaries, and the Education Ministry oversaw curriculum and policy. But like many problems for which there should be government support, she would have to take this one on at the KCCA.

Musisi’s visit to St. Ponsiano Kyamula left her disturbed and worried for her city’s—her country’s—future. Uganda’s children were, in her mind, a national resource needing support to deliver on

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Uganda’s potential. Referring to her own attendance in public school, she said, “Look at where I am now as a useful citizen. All I needed was to be given an opportunity to go to a decent school, and the schools were decent then.” The children had not changed, of course. As each subsequent school visit reminded her, the pupils were bright and lively, and demanding more. Even with “all the books on the floor because they don’t have shelving or tables, the kids are so eager to learn they are sitting on the floor and reading,” she observed.

As KCCA executive director, her resources would never be enough. She would need to mobilize new resources of all kinds, which depended on showing that local administration was both competent and trustworthy. Seeing the need, Musisi felt there was no time to wait. Even with so much out of her hands—the budget, the curriculum, the teacher training—she would try to do something.

Schools of Kampala

In 2011 when the KCCA took over administration of the city, Kampala had about 123,000 primary-age pupils, divided roughly equally between 400 private schools (ranging widely in cost and quality), and eighty-one government-run schools. (See Appendix 1 for a description of the general situation in Kampala in 2011.)

Of those eighty-one government-run primary schools, KCCA had title to only four. The other seventy-seven sat on land that belonged to, or was administered by, one of a handful of controlling authorities, such as the Uganda Land Commission, Kampala District Land Board, or sometimes a religious body. “Land-grabbing,” as it was generally called, posed a constant threat to African schools.¹ In Kampala, the controlling bodies could sell a leasehold for a defined period—usually forty-nine or ninety-nine years—to an outside investor who might want to develop the land for commercial purposes or just knock down existing structures, even those in good order, and keep the site vacant. Musisi’s own cherished childhood public school had recently become a victim of the wrecking ball. “So, there’s a hotel standing where my school was,” she recalled. “And a shopping mall.”

Right from taking office, Musisi had been studying contracts with private revenue collection agents and suppliers and cancelling bad or illegal ones. She would similarly apply her legalistic focus to regularizing land ownership or tenure by warning land-grabbers against threatening schools and going to court, if necessary, to stop evictions or demolitions. But, like everything else, it would cost money that was not budgeted.

Two approaches seemed manageable and likely to attract support. One was working on the schools one by one, based on their individual needs, which could include fighting to preserve a school’s title, and most of all addressing its infrastructure failures that were endangering children’s health and safety: asbestos roofs, broken windows that let the rain in, an insufficient number of toilets (many broken), and lack of clean water for handwashing. In the same effort, she could try to acquire furniture for classrooms, so books were shelved, and children could sit and work attentively.

¹ See reports by Oxfam and Uganda’s National Association of Professional Environmentalists (links in Nangayi Guyson, “Why are Uganda’s schools disappearing?” *Al Jazeera*, 16 August 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/8/16/why-are-ugandas-schools-disappearing>).

The second, underlying approach would consider education as, to a large extent, an urgent matter of public health. “Every time we’re given an opportunity to make a difference, we should take it,” Musisi said. “Here our children are exposed to asbestos, which causes cancer. Here are girls who can’t go to school because there are no toilets. Children can’t wait for you to develop a five-year plan. Even one year counts.” She added, “If you realize you can’t walk away, there is always something you can do.”

“I Respond to Need”

Recent decades had brought advances in Ugandan education. As in other African countries, adoption of Universal Primary Education (UPE) meant primary education was free, except for small parental contributions for uniforms and meals. No children were to be turned away.

Improved access was not the same as quality, however. In 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa, with the world’s fastest-growing population, and among the youngest, the literacy rate for both adults (60.3 percent) and youth (70.8) was the world’s worst.² In Uganda, the literacy rate at 73 percent was higher than the average, and roughly comparable to that of its neighbors Tanzania and Rwanda, but below Kenya’s 87 percent.³

Uganda, in the vicinity of Africa’s Great Lakes and also Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea and thus close to some of the world’s most intractable conflicts, had among the world’s highest population of refugees: nearly one million, half of them children. About one hundred thousand foreign refugees made their way, like Uganda’s rural migrants, to Kampala, where the additional children further strained resources. They, too, could not be turned away.

Between 2012 and 2020, the number of primary-age children in Uganda was expected to rise from 8.1 million to 9.4 million.ⁱⁱ Meanwhile, the government allocation for education spending was only about \$160 (PPP-adjusted) per primary-school pupil per year, the lowest among thirty-six countries in a contemporary study.⁴ Musisi, now responsible for Kampala schools, estimated she had \$3.20 per student in her city budget to add to education.

Teachers, not just students, had problems that Musisi knew needed addressing. The same study of thirty-six countries revealed that Uganda’s teachers were the worst paid, below Egypt and Ghana. In Kampala, at any given point, 11 percent of teachers were absent, and of the rest, 38 percent were, for whatever reason, not in class, meaning classrooms of one hundred children might have no teacher in the room.⁵ Most of the central government education allocation each year went to teacher salaries, with only about UGX 2 billion (\$700,000) designated for school infrastructure development. Essentially, there was nothing extra for Musisi to spend on the properties the KCCA was responsible for, all built decades ago.

Like most African capitals, Kampala received most of its budget—86 percent—from a central government grant that earmarked funds for services including health and education. Musisi could not take money from one part of the approved budget to pay for another. And KCCA’s taxation powers

ⁱⁱ “Global Teacher Status Index 2018,” from Varkey Foundation. Ghana’s PPP-adjusted per pupil (primary school) spending is \$374; India’s \$534. The other thirty-two countries (including Egypt, Panama, Indonesia, and Peru) spend well over \$1,000 per primary-school pupil per year. (“PPP” is Purchasing Power Parity.)

were limited; as a poor, fast-growing city with an outdated property database, much new construction was not even taxed, including expensive commercial buildings like the one built on the site of Musisi’s demolished public school. A longstanding presidential directive that prohibited taxing owner-occupied property meant the tax base at the KCCA’s disposal was small. In her first years in office, Musisi had been exceptionally successful at raising and collecting revenues through transit, business license advertising, and other fees, although enormous social and political upheaval accompanied the effort. Only the national government or the elected officials on the KCCA could increase rates. But as late as May 2018, against Musisi’s strong objection, the KCCA voted to reduce the property tax from 6 to 4 percent.⁶

“I respond to need,” Musisi often said. Political constraints ruled out new taxation or reallocating resources. What could she do on her own?

The Private Sector

Given the government’s limitations, improvements to student health and well-being would have to come via the private sector, which—in Kampala—often resisted involvement in areas they believed were the government’s responsibility. Nor was it likely to start without improved confidence in government or administrations that required a baseline of competence. Among multinationals planting their footprints in African capitals, corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs were increasingly seen as a potential source of support; Airtel, the sponsor of the school Musisi visited, was the newly obtained local subsidiary of an Indian telecommunications giant based in Delhi. But Airtel had painted the school in its corporate colors, and Musisi said there had to be limits: “I didn’t think it was okay for a company to invest this amount of money and take up the entire school in tons of branding. [For one thing], we’d have all the schools branded for competing companies.” And as an official who needed to raise revenue urgently, Musisi further noted that “The branding is technically an advert. And there’s a whole revenue stream for advertisement. If you allow them to advertise on the school, are you therefore waiving the advertising fees?”

Another option was private charity. At Kamwokya Primary School, in a poor neighborhood, there was a head teacher Musisi and her staff admired, Jane Kansiime. “She’d gotten all these donations herself,” recalled Judith Tumusiime, the KCCA deputy executive director and the official in charge of the education and social services directorate from 2011 to 2016. “Materials, funding, even shoes for the children.”⁷ Kansiime’s school had a long-standing partnership with a Canadian charity, the Mondetta Foundation, which in time produced a magnificent new classroom block. Additional KCCA support meant a third story could be added to the original two-story addition, housing six classrooms and totaling nine new classrooms.

Musisi, by virtue of her position and charisma, had the potential to do more. “To be that figurehead was huge,” said Tumusiime, “and Jennifer was always available to support innovation 100 percent and run with it.” Because of “the brand” Musisi was building at KCCA, donors became interested. “Jennifer’s integrity was her trademark,” said Kulthum Nabunya, an official in the KCCA education directorate. “People wanted to see her.”⁸

Surprisingly, perhaps, Musisi did not feel enormous civic pressure about improving the schools. “I think people in Uganda . . . we’ve just sort of given up trying. They’ve asked and asked and asked and after years of nothing is really done, it’s: ‘I just need to get some money and take my children to a private school.’”

Musisi was used to giving Kampala a jolt when she felt it needed one, and she wanted her team to decide how to give the schools a jolt as well—and maybe prod the government to properly fund schools in the process. A private-sector network tapped for donations could start with local small businesses and be extended to embassies, NGOs, and charitable expatriate institutions like the Indian Women’s Club. Success with prominent supporters might improve prospects for school reform’s best option: a drastic increase in government funding.

Musisi and her senior KCCA team could set an example through fundraising. After another school visit where she saw “eighty children queuing for one broken toilet and no water to wash their hands,” Musisi had returned to her management team with an idea of doing something on their own, right away, for the Kampala schools: namely, a small recurring monthly donation drawn from their own salaries. The first to donate, she was immediately joined by her colleagues. “No one felt forced,” recalled Tumusiime. “All felt it was the right thing to do. And since it was deducted at the source, we didn’t even feel it.”

The limits Musisi set were her own. She would not fundraise abroad for the schools, even though she spoke before a large audience at international meetings often enough. “I didn’t think I should fundraise for Ugandan schools in Europe,” Musisi said. “I want people to own it because these are our children.”

Identifying Needs, Matching Donors

Money from the KCCA senior management team’s fund would be put toward the only school KCCA actually built during Musisi’s tenure, a nursery school.ⁱⁱⁱ Otherwise the “project”—as Musisi suggested calling it, acknowledging its informality—was for renovating schools one by one as resources became available, right until the end of her term. In this time, KCCA worked to remove asbestos from roofs; paint and renovate classrooms or whole classroom blocks; provide desks, shelves, and books; and install or improve toilets. In each case, a healthier environment would be created for students. The work was always an ongoing negotiation, and even, thanks to Musisi’s single-mindedness and personality, an escalation. “Initially it was ‘Can we have adequate toilets for the school children?’ . . . Then the next step was, ‘If you build a toilet, can it please be a bio-toilet? Or can it be a flush pedal toilet? And if it’s a flush pedal toilet, can we please have two shower rooms for the girls’ side?’”

For the school buildings, efforts ramped up to get donations for dozens of schools. Local small businesses, national corporations or nonprofit associations, multinationals, charities, NGOs, and embassies could be prompted to offer materials or money for specific items on a wish list. In the KCCA’s education directorate, Nabunya compiled a detailed “needs assessment” form for each school

ⁱⁱⁱ In addition to the nursery school, the management team’s “schools fund” paid for water filtering systems for ten schools and a perimeter wall around one school afflicted by neighborhood crime. According to Tumusiime, the rationale for building a preschool rather than renovating a primary school was to “show opportunities for children and families from an early age, what education is like in a safe, clean place with good ambience.”

as the basis for approaching donors. (See Appendix 2 for one of Nabunya’s school needs-assessment spreadsheets.) And there were plenty of them. “Most of them wanted to shake Jennifer’s hand,” Nabunya recalled. “They listened; they came to visit the school and grounds. Often, later, they physically did the work.” Musisi recalled the team asking for “paint, or if it’s usable, paint in damaged packaging they couldn’t sell, so they’d give me that plus more.” If a local outfit offered second-tier roofing, with a little prompting from Musisi or Nabunya the firm would often upgrade it. The KCCA team stayed in touch with these donors during the renovation, so they knew that “if you give us fifty tins of paint, you can see that the fifty tins were used,” Musisi said, and more broadly: “If you give us money, we’ll use the money and if there’s any left over, we’ll tell you, ‘There’s this amount left over, can we use it to buy desks?’ And then they would say, ‘Fine, put it in desks or reuse it . . .’ It would depend, but I think one of the biggest things that gave us traction was credibility.”

Musisi relied on Nabunya for much of this work; not only was she a former teacher turned administrator, but her husband was a prominent member of Kampala’s Muslim community. Not all prospective donors delivered: Nabunya recalled one who promised to completely renovate Nateete Muslim Girls Primary School but balked when he saw the scale of the work—new ceilings, for instance. “I didn’t know I had to spend all this!” he said. Nabunya found another donor to complete the work.

Facing Down Corruption

Musisi would not instill confidence in her administration as long as traditional forms of corruption and official neglect in Kampala persisted. She saw this in the battles over school land title, where sometimes officials or even school administrators were complicit in siphoning off land or buildings in the interests of private developers. In January 2015, overnight, a developer with rights to the land demolished the Nabagereka Primary School, one of the oldest in East Africa, even though \$150,000 had been spent on improvements as part of the fight against eviction; a thousand students and their teachers arrived at school the next morning to find it in rubble.⁹

With the private-sector donation campaigns, there were some risks of unsavory associations, but, said Nabunya, vetting donors was not usually a problem: “We knew these people. They were high-paying taxpayers. Knowing the type of business, we knew them to be credible.” There were exceptions: a cement manufacturer considered his gift to be a substitute for paying taxes and when KCCA revenue agents visited, he became indignant and retracted his pledge.

In her executive role, Musisi avoided talking money with donors and restricted herself mainly to celebratory occasions, which, Nabunya said, was mainly what donors wanted. But some parties, that were not really donors at all, aimed at using the program as leverage. A foreign contractor managing a large-scale roads program had put in a claim with KCCA for a huge sum—21 billion shillings (roughly seven million dollars)—for “delayed handover of the site,” but Musisi studied the contract, found the claim had been submitted too late, and refused to authorize payment. Soon the foreign contractor was angling to meet her, which Musisi declined, knowing he would try to bribe her. At the time, Musisi was raising resources for the Kasubi Church of Uganda Primary School’s wish list that included cement, paint, and roofing sheets; the local Indian Women’s Club was paying for the labor. When the roads contractor heard, he offered books and furniture to Kasubi. Invited to a ceremony to receive the

donation, Musisi said she would send the education director instead. When the contractor heard, he wanted the event rescheduled with her present; again, Musisi declined.

Politics and Mistrust

Because her efforts in the schools were successful, local politicians often clamored to join KCCA photo opportunities with donors to commemorate the work. But the mutual mistrust on these occasions was high—and not just between the local elected officials and Musisi, who warred on everything from transit, user fees, and street vendors, to perks and salaries, for her entire term in office. Occasionally a lower-level politician, like an area councillor, had been helpful in a school renovation project. But generally, the more senior the politician (e.g., a division mayor or deputy, or, especially, the Lord Mayor), the less the donor wanted him there. Musisi said this was “because of the kind of politicians they were.” She was referring to those who told Kampalans they “didn’t have to pay taxes,” or that Musisi was “probably going to steal that money and probably conniving to sell the school land’ . . . you know, ridiculous accusations like that are just countering your efforts.” And then the politician would want to be part of the donor ceremony. “If the public sees you with him,” she said, “it taints your corporate image, because you’re associating with the negative narrative . . . The donor class comes to complete a process they started with the executive director. I went to them a year ago, presented a need. We worked with them through the process, and finally the building is ready. So, they’re completing a story we started together.”

Musisi realized that such enduring mistrust was a problem for any hopes that local government and the private sector could work together harmoniously to improve Kampala’s schools. The need for the central government to be the principal and consistent source of school funding could not be ignored. Every year that she was in office, she lobbied parliament and President Museveni for more money for Kampala’s schools. But in all that time, the education budget, including the tiny school infrastructure development allocation (roughly \$700,000 annually) never budged, and mostly it was for teacher salaries:

KCCA Education & Social Services Allocation (in billions of Ugandan shillings)^{iv}

| | 2012-13 | 2013-14 | 2014-15 | 2015-16 | 2016-17 |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| (Actual) | 26.04 | 27.99 | 36.76 | 36.16 | 36.5 |
| Salaries (Planned) | 17.99 | 18.71 | 21.52 | 24.64 | 26.8 |
| School Infrastructure (Planned) | | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.14 | 2.67 |

Over time, Musisi found herself ambivalent about the effort and began to think that donations were not the solution: “I don’t believe in donations, long-term. Donations are good perhaps to kick-start, but we need to have a long-term plan of maintaining ourselves. I also do not believe that Ugandan projects should be majorly [sic] funded by donors, whether internal or external donors.”

She had hoped the influx of donations, as well as growth in revenues as the city became more self-supporting, might result in government being, as she put it, “inspired to give more” which would have

^{iv} Compiled from KCCA annual reports or “ministerials” presented by the federal Minister of Kampala to parliament for each fiscal year.

the added benefit of “giving the partners encouragement to see that government was also pulling its weight.”

Adding it all up, she scored quantifiable successes as seen in the figures in the March 2017 issue of the KCCA magazine, *The Steward*.^v Not all schools benefited equally, however, and the KCCA did not meet the full needs assessment of the schools they did help; resources almost always fell short of delivering some significant need. A lot of the good work could be undone, too—by damage or theft, or buried in rising numbers of pupils. The strategy was not sustainable. (See Appendix 3 for photographs of Kampala schools.)

2018 was a difficult year. Fourteen schools were still in jeopardy over contested land titles. In May, KCCA’s vote to reduce the property tax rate to 4 percent further squeezed revenues already diminished by a November 2017 presidential directive to suspend transit collections. In summer, Parliament cut the general budget. In September, Musisi made one of her most controversial decisions—cancelling the annual Kampala City Festival, a three-day event in October that she had created and that had grown into one of East Africa’s most popular street parties. Announcing the decision three weeks before the event, the KCCA committed the sums pledged for the Festival be put towards Kampala’s schools—specifically to replace the last asbestos roofs. One month later, October 18, she announced her resignation as executive director, effective mid-December, listing in her eighteen-page letter all the school refurbishments KCCA had overseen in her years in office.

Her last week at the KCCA, she recalled, she spent mostly in schools where children sang to her and gave her thank-you cards. New projects were launched, among them a “talent room” in one school, a girls’ sanitary-pad project in five more, and a renovation to a sixth, sponsored by a Ugandan state agency, the National Social Security Fund. On her second to last day, Musisi pledged the last of her KCCA management team’s fund (about 60 million shillings) to be added to a sum raised by schoolchildren in private schools, to remove the last asbestos roofs in Kampala’s schools. In her final week, she was still fighting over land titles for schools: this time against the Kampala archdiocese, which had a lease for Ntinda Primary School that it wanted to appropriate for its private school and that KCCA was refusing to hand over.¹⁰

In nearly eight years, Musisi had attracted more resources to more schools than any administration in recent Kampala history, and demonstrated to exacting donors—the Irish embassy, for instance, which outfitted a computer lab at Nakivubo Primary School—that their money was well spent. In lieu of structural changes beyond her reach, she had offered dynamism, so that one gift catalyzed the next one. She had tried to walk the ethical tight line both with donors, her own staff, and Kampala politicians. Within the small space she could operate, she had improved conditions, even if her hope for more national funding came to nothing. For her, the lessons were to show local government cared and could make change happen, and the process could be done with integrity. Each child in a safer, cleaner school building was a healthier child. “Sometimes you need solutions right now,” she said, “however sustainable. There’s always a moral imperative to invest in children.”

^v Cited in the magazine: 120 classrooms and 1,383 three-seater desks installed in 22 schools, along with 633 new toilet “stances”; 160 desktop computers and 35 laptops supplied to 27 schools; and 7 primary schools fenced (Juliet Namaddu, “Advancing Education in the City,” *Kampala Steward*, Issue 7, March 2017).

Appendices

Appendix 1 Kampala in 2011

Kampala’s challenges were enormous when Jennifer Musisi became the KCCA executive director in 2011. One of Africa’s fastest-growing cities, projected to triple in population from 1.9 million between 2020 and 2040, Kampala had already doubled in just twenty years, to 1.6 million, in 2010. Like other African cities, Kampala’s growth was characterized by an economically wasteful pattern of low-density, high-sprawl topography with considerable vacant land (8 to 10 percent) that was not only undeveloped, but untaxed. Less than half the roughly 1,200 kilometers of Kampala roads were properly surfaced with only 20 percent “considered in good condition.”^{vi}

Slums housed over half the population and extended in all directions from the city center into wetlands adjacent to Lake Victoria. Kampala’s largely unpaved and unlighted road system was choked with traffic (especially, in the absence of public transport, with large numbers of unregistered minibus and motorcycle taxis), and generally unregulated commerce added to the universal chaos. Kampala’s plight led a group of geographers to observe that continuing “business-as-usual” development “will lead to inhuman conditions for the majority of the urban population between 2020 and 2030. Millions of urban inhabitants will live in flood-prone slum areas by 2030, suffering from epidemic diseases . . . without the construction of new roads, the majority of people will have very limited mobility which makes their participation in the formal economy almost impossible.”¹¹

Kampala’s expiring city government, Kampala City Council (KCC), had tried to tackle these problems but was largely seen as a failure: not up to the job, and also highly corrupt. KCC officials and their associates had been active in illicit sale or occupation of city-owned real estate and property, and they were known for signing skimpy or improper (and poorly enforced) service deals with contractors and private developers. In some respects, the city appeared to be, in the words of one analyst, “a huge marketplace, in which virtually all urban land is exploited for private profit, very often without formal approval. The only substantial park in the city was turned into a cluster of restaurants targeted at the elite and middle class, and the only children’s playground in the city centre was likewise sold off to a group of former military personnel for development, in both cases without planning permission.”¹²

Under KCC, Kampala picked up less than one-third of its garbage, resulting in an estimated one-hundred thousand uncollected tons each year.¹³ KCC was an inefficient tax collector, contracting private agents to collect official fees on 10 percent commission and still collecting under 50 percent of projections.¹⁴

^{vi} From a May 2015 Global Credit Rating Report (Johannesburg) on the KCCA, four years into its existence: “Only around 23 percent of Kampala’s area is considered fully urbanized, with access to a full range of municipal services. The bulk of the area (around 60 percent) is semi-urbanized and comprises 62 informal slums, housing an estimated 560,000 families. The remainder of land area is still considered rural,” pg. 2.

Appendix 2 KCCA “Needs Assessment” Form

Analysis of Data in Lubago Schools (from KCCA)

| SCHOOL | WATER TANKS | DESKS | CLASS ROOMS | FENCING | KITCHEN | PAVING | STAFF HOUSES | GENERAL REFURBISHMENT | RE-ROOFING (# IRON SHEETS) | LIBRARY | COMPUTERS | COMPUTER LABS | TOILETS (STANCES) | ADMINISTRATION BLOCKS | LIBRARY | PAINT TO RENOVATE OLD CLASSROOMS (JERRICANS) | SICK BAY | LIGHTENING CONDUCTORS |
|--|-------------|-------|-------------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------|-----------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------|--|----------|-----------------------|
| KCCA BUSECA COMMUNITY PS | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| QUEEN OF PEACE PS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| NAMIREMBE INFANTS PRIMARY | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| MACKAY MEMORIAL PS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| NAMUNGOONA KIGOBE PS | 0 | 100 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 53 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MUSLIM GIRLS PS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ST'. JOSEPH MAPEERA MEM PS | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LUBIRI PS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MENGO PS | 0 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NAMUNGOONA ORTHODOX PS | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| KABOWA C/UPS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 53 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| MUTUNDWE COU | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| KITEBI PS | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| KASUBI COU PS | 0 | 150 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 53 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| KASUBI FAMILY | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NATEETE MUSLIM PS | 0 | 100 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| KAMPALA SCHOOL FOR THE PHYS. HANDICAPPED | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UGANDA MATYRS PS | 0 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 53 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 2 | 400 | 58 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 86 | 32 | 305 | 6 | 562 | 1 | 143 | 1 | 0 | 250 | 2 | 3 |

Appendix 3 Kampala School Photos

KCCA executive director Jennifer Musisi with members of the Indian Women’s Association at Kasubi Church of Uganda Primary School, November 2017



Source: KCCA Facebook post, November 11, 2017

Kampala primary school classroom



Source: KCCA magazine, *Kampala Steward*, Issue 8, May 2018

English class, St. James Binna Primary School, 2012



Source: Sustainable Sanitation Alliance

Water tower (for handwashing) next to school toilets, Railway Children Primary School, 2012



Source: Jennifer Burden, World Moms Blog: <https://www.one.org/us/person/world-moms-blog/>, used with permission

Old toilet block, Mulindwa Primary School



Source: Mikael Baker, Pyxera Global, used with permission

Endnotes

¹ All quotations, unless otherwise specified, are from Jennifer Musisi interviews with case authors, 1 March 2019, 27 June 2019, and 5 February 2020.

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⁴ “Education Trends and Projections 2000-2025,” from Education and Policy Data Center (EPDC), published 2013.

⁵ Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) from “Education and Health Services in Uganda,” World Bank, 2013, p. 7.

⁶ Amos Ngwomya, “Property tax kicks up storm at City Hall,” *Daily Monitor*, October 17, 2018.

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¹⁰ “Musisi cautions next KCCA ED against land grabbers,” *The Independent*, 11 December 2018.

¹¹ Karolien Vermeiren, Anton van Rompaey, Maarten Loopmans, Eria Serwaija and Paul Mukwaga, “Urban Growth of Kampala, Uganda: Pattern Analysis and Scenario Development,” *Landscape and Urban Planning* 106:2, 30 May 2012, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2012.03.006>.

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¹³ Gina Lambright, “Opposition Politics and Urban Service Delivery in Kampala, Uganda,” United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Working Paper 2012/51, May 2012, p. 7.

¹⁴ UN Habitat, *Property Tax Regimes in East Africa*, Nairobi, 2013, p. 34.